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POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR LUNAR DEVELOPMENT 
CHARLES D. O"DALE 
1025 Grenon Ave .. Suite 91 l. Ouawa. Ontario. Canada. K2B 855 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A Lunar Base project wi ll not begin until early nellt century. However, the legal and strategic 
framework around which it will be planned are under construction today. Important questions such 
as the base's tong-term purpose are being lefl unanswered while we plan its technical 
implemenrntion. but if we are to see a lunar base become part of an effective and pennanent space 
infrastructure of use to future projects, the goals towards which it will reach and the conflicts it will 
face must be addressed. This paper discusses some of the factors which will play a role in forming 
a lunar base project and considers some solutions to resolve the conflicts these factors create. 
2. A PPROACHES TO LUNAR DEVELOPMENT 
The perspectives which will drive a lunar base project may be placed into three general 
categories: Scientific, Industrial and Social-Political. 
A Scientific perspective is concerned with utilizing the Moon and its resources in the pursuit 
or knowledge. As outlined by the European Space Agency', scientific projects may be categorized 
into science <!f the Moon (gaining a greater understanding of the Moon and its origins), on the Moon 
(utilizing the properties of the lunar environment to study fields such as human physiology or 
materials science) and from the Moon (using the Moon as a platform for astronomy). 
A lunar laboratory would strive to produce as small an environmental impact as possible since 
even minute contamination from sources such as propellant exhaust can spread throughout the entire 
Moon's atmosphere within a matter of hours1, reducing the scientific yield from observations. 
Succe:-.:-. would be measured by the scientific understanding lunar operations brought to humanity. 
An Industrial approach is concerned with utilizing lunar resources to generate material 
benefits. These benefits may incl.ude energy projects utilizing solar power or He.1 fusion, the mining 
and refining of lunar materials for use in Earth orbit or, paralleling the goals of scientific study 011 
the Moon. utilizing the lunar environment to pursue experiments which may yield commercially 
valuable results. Industrial work, as a result of its exploitive nature, will disrupt the lunar 
environment: However, as the focus of industrialization is on making the most effective use of lunar 
resources. the degree of this disruption is not a strong consideration. 
Fol lowing a Social-Political perspective. the goals of the lunar base lie not with the project 
itself but with the "spin-off" effects derived from it. This perspective has been at the root of pasl 
sp;1ce projects. such us the Apollo program's sp;1ce race. and remains a strong innuence today·1. 
While Social-Political goals do not depend on the output of a project. they do innuence design 
decisions which affect the achievement of scientific and industrial goals. In some cases, as with the 
decision to shift the International Space Station to the orbit of 5 1.6° to enable the participation of 
Russia and the resulting reduction of the Space Shuttle·s launch window to 5 minu1es~. the logistic 
complications created by accommodating Social-Political goals can increase project costs and reduce 
the potential for scientific and industrial benefits 
Although the application or Social-Political considerations. such as the stimulation of 
employment. may reduce the effectiveness (lf a lunar project's implementation. the benefits 10 
.. , 
society created by these goals can he .signilkant. For exampk. while international par1icipa1ion in 
a project 1ends to increase its cost and complexity ' . 1he communication networks and infrastructure 
built to accomplish il may he :1pplied to other private or puhli1.: sector j\1i11t-ventun:s: which in lllrn 
s1imulate pa11icipating segments of the economy and t.>nahle the pursuit of rda1ed projects. The 
management lesson.s learned by facing the problems of inlerna1ional participation may also he 
applied to future technology programs~ or day-to-day political ncgotiaiion. Soci:tl-Politkal fac1ors 
of litt le long-term benefit. such as the n:1tionalistic emotional satisfaction of the !!Cncral public and 
the vicarious adventure felt by observing a space program should also he 1.:on~id<:rt::d as it will he 
the general public. through government taxation. whi1.:h will pay for the fir~! siag<:s of a r<:turn to 
the Moon. 
3. RESOLVING THE DEVELOPMENT CONFLICTS OF AN EARLY LUNAR BASE 
Should Social-Political concerns play .- pivotal role in th<: development of a lunar ha~e 
infrastructure · - for example. in accommodating ~pace hardw:1re from many nalions lo enahk ;rn 
international effort ·- the progr:.im may he hindered from the st:trt by attempting to he hm many 
things for too many people. Infrastructure problems may also arise :is the h:t.'c expand~ if 
transportation and support services arc designed with only a snrnll scientifo.: lunar outpost or sh11rt-
term piloted missions in mind. 
If a scientific perspective is allowed to dominate the lunar dcvclopml'lll planning procc~~. 1hc 
possibilities for industrialization may be rc.~trictcd by lcgi.,l<11icm which l·urhs the dcg.rl'C of 
development in order to protect the lunar c11vironmcnt for oh~crvatil11i. When nm~idcred al th<:ir 
extremes. the scientific 'and industrial pcr~pcctives cannot operate tog<:ther nn the Moon if th<:y ar<: 
each to reach their highest potential for succ.:ess. A~ the hasis of this conflict lie~ with the kvcl of 
development required by each to reach their go:ils -- indu~try".' ideal being unrc~tricted accc"s to 
the Moon·s resources. ~cience·s being the minimum disruption of the lurwr e nvironment -- Wl' m:ty 
assume that this problem will remain for many decades. As the co~t.' and dcl:ir a.~~ociated with 
resol ving this connict may be expected to rise as the lun;1r ha ... e pn1jcl'I progre~.,t·~ ;md it' 
complellily increase.-.. it would be best lo work out :t ~olution now. 
Since large-scale private sector industrialization will not he feasible for the fir~! kw llct·ade' 
of lunar development7• industrial concerns could accommodate a ten nr twenty ye:tr morn1orium un 
large~scale resource exploitation. During the moratorium. the .,tudy of the Moon in it" n:llural .'talc 
could be pursued without interference. Al the ~ame time. ~111;111-scalc demonstrator facilit il'' for 
projects such as Oxygen fuel production or solar power collection could he operated v. ith lhe intcnl 
of refining the technologies required for full-scak ... y ... 1ems. 
Establishing specific goals and a strong. uniform managcm<:nt ... 1n1l·ture lo carry them out j, 
essential if p lanning for the effective USl' of lunar re~ource~ b to he rcconc.:ikd with our on<: chanc<: 
to study the lunar environment in its undi~turhed ~late . A ideal lu11;1r mlmini~tratinn would al'o 
have the capability to regulate Social-Political goab' whidi might ntherwi.'e O\'Crwhclrn the rrojecl 
and dilute its scientific and industrial bencfih Although economic reali!ie' dicl<ite lh:tt a 
rejuvcna1ed Moon program will be an intcrn:11io11al cffon. a di~tinct proj<:ct Jc:1tlcr llll"t he prc,cnt 
if lhe differences hctween developmellt pcrspccli\'e~ mid the need" of intcrnation;il partnt·r, an: to 
he balanced wi1hout frequently rede~igning the project and chan!!ing ih ohjt::ctiv<:'. 
4. RESOLVING THE DEVELOPi\IENT CONFLICTS OF A !\IAT~RE LUNAR HASE 
A~ the moratorium end .... the cmpha.'i' on ha't:: pl:mning will 'hi ft from lunar cxplor;11ion to 
rt::,ource exploitation. The danger nf thi' period ''ill Ile !he 11\erwhclmi11g of 'ci<:mific intcrt::'I' hy 
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indus1rial concerns and the disruption of lunar regions of scicn1ific value. 
Since any activity will contaminate the Moon to some degree, after a few decades of human 
and machine presence at a scientific base the lunar environment will no longer be pristine. This 
disruption may be offset by setting aside areas of scientific interest as lunar "reservations" or, in 
later decades. limiting activities which disrupt large areas of the Moon. These limits should be 
compa1ible with activities such as lunar mining or 0 2 extraction for fuel as they require a relatively 
small area or the Moon for operations. However, project~ which cause a large environmental 
impact. such as the mining of lunar HeJ (which requires the annual dredging of many cubic 
kilometres of soil to obtain marketable quantities of fusion fuel9), may not be at all compatible with 
scientific interests. As much about the lunar environment and the technologies which will be used 
there remains unknown, a responsible decision as to how much exploitation is too much will have 
to wait. The data obtained from an early lunar research outpost will assist in setting reasonable 
limits to large-scale development. 
For the creation of an administration to direct lunar development, the United Nations Moon 
Agreement -- even though ratified by only 9 minor or non-spacefaring nations -- may be expected 
to play a strong role10• One of the rea~ons that major spacefaring nations have not accepted the 
Moon Agreement lies with Article XI of the document, which puts forward the concept that the 
Moon and all other celestial bodies are of the Common Heritage of Mankind (CHM) and are not 
open to claim of ownership from any nation or private party. Since a nation accepting this 
agreement would forfeit major interests in future space industrialization while gaining nothing in 
return. there has been little incentive to sign. As a result, the legal position of would-be private 
interests on the Moon still remains unknown. 
While the concept that "the Moon belongs to everyone" is just and does not interfere with the 
pursuit of scientific research. it does create difficulties when the activities of lunar industrialization 
arc brought into play. Although scientific research may be performed commercially without 
securing the ownership of lunar real-estate, the inability to stake claim to areas of the Moon for 
purposes of mining. fuel production or the placement of energy collection stations leaves uncertainty 
and risk which private investors find unacceptable. As the direct participation of the private sector 
in a lunar program would provide management, technology and human resource experience refined 
by centuries of open market competition, it would be best to resolve the legal uncertainties 
surrounding lunar industrialization as early in the program as possible and encourage the 
participation of this group. 
The Moon Agreement declares that an International Regime is to be established which will " .. 
govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the Moon as such exploitation is about to become 
feasible" and ensure the equitable distribution of industrialization's benefits among humanity. As 
multi-national projects such as the International Space Station have shown however, the 
compromises necessary to satisfy even a handful of participating nations increases the cost and 
complexity of a project11 • When faced with this reality, the prospect of directing a project with an 
all-inclusive global partnership becomes nightmarishly impractical. 
Although an ideal International Lunar Regime would enable representation from all segments 
of Earth's population. the limitations of our present social and political systems must be recognized. 
While the international satellite administration organization INTELSAT grants decision making 
control on the basis of financial contributions of member nations. and thus limits the influence of 
poorer developing countries, it has proven to be an effective means of managing orbital space 
resources and provides a reference for the development of an International Lunar Regime12• 
However. unlike commercially oriented INTELSAT. a lunar base program will begin as a 
-;cicntific venture. with the possibility of commercial activities occurring only a few decades after 
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bilse inception. Since conflicts will change as the hase ;.hifls from an exploration to an exploitation 
perspective. and as many of the factors influencing development decisions will he undcrs1ood only 
after the scientific lunar hasc has heen established. the system chosen for lunar administration must 
remain flexihle. One such reference model may he found in the Antarctic Treaty System 1' . which 
has remained :idaptable and cooperative in outlook through JO years of aclivity. Although few 
commercial concerns have been dealt with in Antarctica11''·1 • the experience g:iined in negotiating 
compromises with different parties over limited resources will still remain relevant to :i lunar base 
The lessons learned from the commercial model of INTELSAT. the scic11'ific mrn.k·l applied to 
Antarctica and the attempt to mix bo1h with Social-Political considcrntions on 1he International 
Space Station project should he considered when e.~tablishing an lntcrnution:il Lunar Regime to 
balance the needs of science and industry. 
S. RECONCILING INDUSTRY WITH THE "COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND" 
When choosing systems of industrialization. !he most effectivi: remains the frei:-market capitalist 
system. However. capitalism is ethically neutral and docs no1 contain within itself mechanisms lo 
ensure that the exploitation of lunar resources rem:iins within the spirit of CHM. Thi;. prohlcm may 
he dealt with by combining the legal concept of usufruct with the lntcrnatio11al Regime discussed 
in the Moon Agreement. Usufruct. whose use dates hack to the agi: of the Roman Empirc1J. is the 
granting of exclusive rights to use and enjoy property held in common or owned by another party 
as if it were a person·s own. Under a perfect usufruct the physical ch:irnctcristics nf property arc 
left unchanged after use: for example. in huil<ling and u;.ing a structure on another person's l;md. 
An imperfect usufruct deals with consurn;1ble propc11y which is unusahlc hy the usufructuary. hut 
which may be consumed for benefit by another party. Given that the Moon"s resources arc thi: 
common property of humanity. hut arc a u;.elcss a:-.;.et if inact•t•ssihlc. the crn11.:ept of imperfect 
usufruct may be applied to lunar development with the International Regime ;icting in the itHi:rc;.t;. 
of humanity. 
One scenurio would see a prospective lunar industrialist ohwin a leasi: of a century duration 
from the International Regime. During the period of lca>-c. any cnh;mccmcnt;. made to the lunar 
region would belong to the industrialist. who would he entitled to rcvenui:;. derivi:d from thi:sc 
fac ilities. At the time of !case expiry. the lun;1r region and .ill facilitie.~ constructed 1m it would once 
again come under the jurisdiction of the International Rcgimt· 
Before approval for use of a lunar region would be granted. projects would rc4uirc certification 
by the International Regime. which would h;ilt projects not in thi: hc.~t long-term intere,t>- of lurrnr 
development or which would infringe on the rights of other u~cr;. of lunar territory. The Regime 
would also play an observer role to cn;.urc cornpli;mce with luri:tr ell\ irnnmental 'tandanb and 
resolve disputes between lunar ··1cnam;.·· 
As an industrialist would be granted legal guarantee' a;.,crting their cxclu,ivc right to u'c a 
particular lunar region for a period of time .wfficicnt to pro\'idc a large return on their inve;.tmenl. 
the rbk of loss of assets or revenue due to uwncr,hip dispute' would he reduced. removing many 
deterrent~ to inve.,tmcnt. At the same time. the ln1crnational Ri:gimi: governing lunar affair' would 
retain control of the region. and rccci\"!.' any "'"ct~ and infra;.tructurc e'lahli,hcd on it at the 1ime 
of the lease·~ expiry. These lunar focilitic;. could provide suh;.tanti;il revenue' to the International 
Regime if operations were continued under ih >-upcn·i.,ion. Looking <Lt one ex.ample. a mature lunar 
>-olar power ·'Y>-tem selling energy to Earth could pro,·ide a phcnomcn;d Sl:'i.000 billion ( 1990) U.S. 
annual profit1<. making the Jca,e pcrio<l well '~or1h thi: wait 
If the Common Heritage of :-.!Jankind concept j, cnn,idcred t<J extend al~o to future gencraticms. 
lunar indu~trialization could be con,idcrcd ;i 'iol;1tion {If till' nmccp(, 'pirit. While the 
International Regime would gain control of a lunar region at the end of a lease period, native 
materials would have been consumed to construct or maintain the operation and the area would not 
be left in the pristine and resource rich state from which it started. 
However, with the exception of He_1, it is not the scarcity of lunar elements which makes them 
valuable. but their location. Compared with the monumental efforts required to transport materials 
from Earth to space, the Moon's 1/6 g and lack of atmosphere enables the shipping of native 
materials to Earth orbit with relative ease. As the use of lunar materials may be expected to enable 
humanity's large-scale development of space1(', an effective infrastructure capable of exploiting 
resource rich bodies such as near-Earth asteroids could be expected to follow lunar industry by a 
matter of decades. Given the infinite resources this would provide, the consumption of lunar 
maierials over a few decades is a small and responsible price to pay; one in the best long-term 
interests of the lunar u.~ufructuary, humanity. 
6. CONCLUSION 
If a lunar base is to become part of an effective space infrastructure, the. driving forces of 
Science. Industry and Politics must be balanced. As the conflicts between these forces may be 
expected to change as the lunar base perspective shifts from a research outpost towards an industrial 
facility, the mechanism chosen to regulate them must remain flexible. Existing legislation 
demonstrates that the regulation of limited resources can be accomplished, and offers models which 
may be applied to a lunar administration. 
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